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Abstract
It may take weeks or months before a stealthy attack is detected. As networks
scale up in size and speed, monitoring for such attempts is increasingly a chal-
lenge; collection and inspection of individual packets is difficult as the volume
and the rate of traffic rise. This paper presents an efficient method to overcome
such a challenge. Data reduction has become an integral part of passive network
monitoring, which could be motivated as long as it preserves the required level
of precision. This paper examines the feasibility of employing traffic sampling
together with a simple, but a systematic, data fusion technique for monitoring;
and whether the design of the network affects on non-sampling error. Proposed
approach is capable of monitoring for stealthy suspicious activities using 10%-
20% size sampling rates without degrading the quality of detections.
Keywords: stealthy attacks, Bayesian, simulation, traffic sampling, anomaly
detection
1. Introduction1
Launching stealthy attacks is one of sophisticated techniques used by skillful2
attackers to avoid detection and can take months to complete the attack life3
cycle. Tools and techniques to launch such attacks are widely available. In order4
to detect stealthy activities it is necessary to maintain a long history of what5
is happening in the environment. Most systems cannot keep enough event data6
to track across extended time intervals for this purpose due to the performance7
issues and computational constraints [1, 2]. Decision to inspect each and every8
individual packet for security analysis may consume more resources at network9
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devices for packet processing and more bandwidth for transmissions them to10
collection points [3]. Sophisticated computing systems may be required for11
analysis and storage such a huge volume of data. The performance of network12
can be affected by such overheads and hence to quality of the service. All13
these facts motivate for a data reduction which could be motivated as long as14
it preserves the required level of precision for the monitoring objectives which15
can be either traffic engineering, accounting or security specific.16
This paper presents a study for an efficient monitoring scheme for stealthy17
attacks on computer networks which can consider as an early warning system.18
Traffic sampling is employed together with a simple data fusion technique to19
propose the algorithm which applies over the sampled traffic. The study has two20
objectives. First, investigating the feasibility of proposed method for stealthy21
activity monitoring; and secondly, examining whether design of the network22
affects on detection. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 223
provides a brief overview of intrusion detection in computer systems, and ex-24
plains why conventional methods which are largely developed for rapid attacks25
cannot be employed in stealthy activity monitoring. Section 3 presents a moni-26
toring algorithm which identifies Bayesian approach as a method for information27
fusion. Sampling technique employed by the monitoring scheme is presented in28
Section 4. Section 5 presents a methodological way to trace anonymous stealthy29
activities to their approximate sources. Experimental design is presented in30
Section 6. Sections 7 presents experimental outcomes. Related literature is pre-31
sented in Section 8. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 9 where further32
work is also suggested.33
2. Security Monitoring34
Computer systems are dynamic systems having many components such as35
clients, servers, switches, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). At36
each time interval these components produce large amounts of event based data37
which, in principal, can be collected and used for security analysis. The sig-38
nature elements of an attack is scattered spatially and temporally, and often39
embedded within the totality of events of the distributed systems, and motiva-40
tion1 and source2 behind some events are not always certain. In addition there41
are number of monitoring obstacles in such an attack scenario: evidence scarcity42
(weak), colluded activities, large attack surfaces, variety of users and devices,43
high volume high speed environments, normal variations to node behaviours44
and anomalies keep changing over the time [4, 5]. Due to the above challenges45
most of the existing anomaly detection techniques solve a specific formulation46
of the problem which induces by various factors such as data types and types47
11. An alert of multiple login failures, 2. An execution of cmd.exe 3. An abuse of legitimate
credentials either by individuals or malware.
2Using various proxy methods and zombie nodes. manipulation of TCP/IP elements, using
relay or random routing.
2
of anomalies of interested, and encourage unsupervised anomaly detection tech-48
niques [6]. Proposed monitoring scheme in this paper is an effort to address49
most of above obstacles in one solution.50
In signature based intrusion detection an attack scenario signature is needed51
to distinguish a given attack (say A) from other attacks (B and C ) and from52
normal network activities. When a stealthy attack is progressing the critical53
challenge is how to correlate these events across spatial and temporal spaces54
to track various attack scenarios such as A, B and C. The detection accuracy55
relies on the accuracy of scenario signature as well as the accuracy of event56
correlation [7]. Maintaining state information of every packets and comparisons57
between current packets and previous all packets are needed in event correla-58
tion. Most systems cannot keep enough event data to track across extended59
time intervals to do this when a stealthy attack is progressing. As a result the60
scarcity of attack data within a short period of time allows a stealthy attacker61
to go undetected hiding her attempts in the background noise and other traffic.62
Hence using signature detection techniques for stealthy activity monitoring is a63
challenge.64
Proposed monitoring algorithm in this paper is anomaly based. Finding non-65
conforming patterns or behaviours in data is referred to as anomaly detection.66
An intrusion is different from the normal behaviour of the system, and hence67
anomaly detection techniques are applicable in intrusion detection domain [6].68
Intrusive activity is always a subset of anomalous activity is the ordinary belief69
of this idea [8, 9]. When there is an intruder who has no idea of the legitimate70
user’s activity patterns, the probability that the intruder’s activity is detected71
as anomalous is high. This has been formulated in [10] as a pattern recog-72
nition problem. When the actual system behaviour deviates from the normal73
profiles in the system an anomaly is flagged. Information fusion would be a pos-74
sible method for data reduction. However given the nature of problem domain,75
anomaly detection techniques need to be computationally efficient to handle76
large sized of inputs. Hence considering any complex method, e.g. methods like77
Principal Components Analysis [11], for information fusion is ignored as they78
introduce extra computational overheads which aimed to minimise as much as79
possible in this work.80
3. Monitoring Algorithm81
The monitoring algorithm is inspired by previous work [12] which is inspired82
by [13]. It is an incremental approach which updates normal node profiles83
dynamically based on changes in network traffic (events). If some aberrant84
changes happen in network traffic over the time, it should be reflected in profiles85
as well and suspicious activities can be raised based on that profiles is the basic86
assumption. The algorithm has two functions: profiling and analysis.87
3.1. Profiling88
The profiling is the method for evidence fusion across space and time by89
updating node profiles dynamically based on changes in evidence. Simply put,90
3
it computes a suspicion score for each node in the system during a smaller time91
window w and that score is updated as time progresses to compute a node score92
for a larger observation window W . By just looking at an alert generated by an93
event it is impossible to simply judge the motivation (cause) behind it. Other94
contextual information can be used to narrow down the meaning of such an95
event [14]. For example, suspicious port scanning activity may have the following96
characteristics: a single source address, one or more destination addresses, and97
target port numbers increasing incrementally. When fingerprinting such traffic98
analysts examine multiple elements (multivariate) and develop a hypothesis for99
the cause of behaviour on that basis. A similar manner (multivariate approach)100
can be followed in the profiling to acknowledge the motivation uncertainty. Note101
that What and Why are two different questions. Projecting Why into What102
based on your own guesses is methodologically irresponsible. Hence it needs103
a simple, but systematic, approach to profile suspects based on motivation of104
activities instead of number of activities (what you see). In other words, security105
events must be analysed from as many sources as possible in order to assess106
threat and formulate appropriate responses. Extraordinary levels of security107
awareness can be attained by simply listening to what its all indicators are108
telling you [15]. Note that proposed profiling technique in this paper fuses109
information gathered from different sources into a single score for a minimum110
computational cost. It reduces data into a single value which is important to111
maintain information about node activities for a very long observation period112
W . A multivariate version of simple Bayes’ formula is used for this task.113
3.2. The Bayesian paradigm114
The posterior probability of the hypothesis Hk given that E is given by the
well-known Bayes formula:
p(Hk/E) =
p (E/Hk) .p(Hk)
p(E)
(1)
The hypothesis for the monitoring algorithm is built as follows. Let H1 and
H2 be two possible states of a node in a network and define H1 - the node
acts as an attacker and H2 - the node does not act as an attacker. Then H1
and H2 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive states. P(H1) is an expression
of belief, in terms of probability, that the node is in state H1 in the absence
of any other knowledge. Once obtained more knowledge on the proposition H1
through multiple information sources (m indicators), in the form of evidence
E={e1,e2,e3,...,em} on attack surface including the human element, the belief
can be expressed in terms of conditional probabilities as p(H1/E). Using the
Bayes’ theorem in Equation 1 and assuming statistical independence between
information sources:
p(H1/E) =
m∏
j=1
p(ej/H1).p(H1)
2∑
i=1
m∏
j=1
p(ej/Hi).p(Hi)
(2)
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When likelihoods p(ej/Hi) and prior p(Hi) are known, the posterior p(H1/E)115
can be calculated for a given w. These posterior terms p(H1/E) can be accumu-116
lated by time to use as a metric to distinguish suspected nodes from other nodes117
during a W . Note that distinct types of information sources such as signature118
based IDSs, anomaly detection components, file integrity checkers, SNMP-based119
network monitoring systems can be used for this purpose. Hence the assump-120
tion on statistical independence above is reasonable. Any influence/interested121
technical and socio-technical indicators of changes in behaviour (e.g. changes122
in access patterns, differences in use of language, typing patterns, transferring123
large amounts of data onto or off the node, etc; if human actors are involved)124
can be included as input variables (i.e. elements of E) in the profiling algo-125
rithm as long as such indicators operate statistically independent. Extending126
proposed approach to a very large scale attack surface is easy since it is a matter127
of adding a new indicator (attack vector) in E. Existing domain knowledge will128
serve to enhance the performance of this monitoring algorithm since it takes129
advantage of prior knowledge about the parameters. Which is especially use-130
ful when technical data is scarce. However prior and likelihoods are the most131
critical parameters to this approach since Bayes’ factors are sensitive to them.132
Proposed monitoring algorithm would be useful in monitoring threats listed in133
Table 1. The potential threats and their indicators in Table 1 is not exhaustive134
and for illustrating purpose only.135
3.3. Analysis136
The analysis comprised of detecting anomalous profiles in a given set of137
node profiles. If attacker activity pattern is sufficiently reflected by profiles then138
detecting anomalous profiles would be sufficient to identify attackers. This work139
uses a statistical method to detect anomalies. An anomaly is an observation140
in a dataset which is suspected of being partially or wholly irrelevant because141
it is not generated by the stochastic model assumed for that dataset is the142
underlying principle of any statistical anomaly detection technique [17]. Such143
techniques are based on the key assumption that normal data instances occur in144
high probability regions of a stochastic model, while anomalies occur in the low145
probability regions of the stochastic model [6]. Based on these concepts Peer146
and Discord analysis is proposed in this work for detecting stealthy activities in147
a given set of node profiles. Both techniques acknowledge the fact that baseline148
behaviour on networks is not necessarily stable, for example, operational or149
exercise deployments often mean the behaviour of nodes will potentially change150
dramatically. Hence, a defence method that is effective today may not remain151
effective for tomorrow, and any novel algorithm should account for this level152
of complexity. Proposed approach evolves the baseline behaviour by the time153
according to the other network parameters and their current states.154
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3.3.1. Peer analysis155
Aggregating posterior probability terms in Equation 2 over the time helps
to accumulate relatively weak evidence for long periods. These accumulated
probability terms
∑
t
p(H1/E) (t is time), known as node scores, can be used
as a measurement of the level of suspicion of a given node at any given time
with respect to her peers as follows. A given set of node profiles, e.g. profiles
corresponding to a similar peer group, is a uni-variate data set. Hence it is
possible to use the uni-variate version of Grubb’s test [18] (maximum normed
residual test) to detect anomalous points in the set, subject to the assumption
that normal node profiles in a given set follow an unknown Gaussian distribu-
tion [19]. The set-up where it has the distribution is very well a mixture of
Gaussian. Because testing of the hypothesis for any given time is a Bernoulli
trial in this work. Accumulated Bernoulli trials makes a Binomial distribution
which can be approximated by a Normal distribution. For each profile score ω,
its z score is computed as:
z =
ω − ω¯
s
(3)
Where ω¯ and s are mean and standard deviation of the data set. A test instance156
is declared to be anomalous at significance level α if:157
z ≥ T = N − 1√
N
√√√√ t2α/N,N−2
N − 2 + t2α/N,N−2
(4)
where N is the number of profile points in the set, and tα/N,N−2 is the158
value taken by a t-distribution (one tailed test) at the significance level of αN159
and degrees of freedom (N − 2). The α reflects the confidence associated with160
the threshold and indirectly controls the number of profiles declared as anoma-161
lous [6]. Note that the threshold T adjusts itself according to current state of162
a network. This is a vertical analysis to detect one’s aberrant behaviour with163
respect to her peers. In other words it compares each node’s activity changes164
against to activity changes of her peer group. Hence it is called as peer analysis165
in this paper. This analysis technique accounts for regular variations such as166
diurnal, familiarity and ageing.167
Looking at one’s aberrant behaviour within similar peer groups (e.g. same168
user types, departments, job roles, etc.) gives better results in terms of false169
alarms than setting a universal baseline [20, 21]. Hence first classifying similar170
nodes into peer groups, based on behaviour related attributes/features, and then171
applying the monitoring algorithm is recommended. Investigations for suitable172
classification algorithms for this task is left as a future work.173
3.3.2. Discord analysis174
When a stealthy attack is progressing, malicious activities are occurring175
according to an on-off pattern in time. As a result, lack of agreement or harmony176
between points in the profile sequence of a given node can occur in a similar177
or different on-off fashion. This type of anomalies are known as discords [22].178
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In a stealthy attack environment, discords are random time context and peer179
analysis technique itself is not sufficient to detect them if the progression rate180
of malicious activities is far lower than the similar innocent activities. The181
objective of discord analysis in this work is to detect sub-sequences within a182
given sequence of profiles which is anomalous with respect to the rest of the183
sequence. Problem formulation occurs in time-series data sets where data is184
in the form of a long sequence and contains regions that are anomalous. The185
underlying assumption is that the normal behaviour of the time-series follows186
a defined random pattern, and a sub-sequence within the long sequence which187
does not conform to this pattern is an anomaly. In general, the purpose of this188
analysis is to detect one’s aberrant behaviour with respect to her own behaviour189
regardless of her peers. Following method is proposed for discord analysis.190
At the (t − 1)th time point, using an Auto-regressive integrated moving191
average model ARIMA(p, d, q) [23] which describes the auto-correlations in192
the data, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) for the tth profile score is predicted.193
If the observed profile score at time t lies outside of the predicted CI then194
absolute deviation of the profile score from CI is calculated. This deviation is195
used as a measure of non-conformity of a given profile score to the pattern of196
its own sequence (group norms). These deviations average out over time to197
calculate the anomaly score for a given node. Note that this anomaly score198
is the average dissimilarity of profile scores with its own profile sequence of a199
node. This dissimilarity occurs randomly from time to time due to the deliberate200
intervention of the attacker. The length of the ARIMA model (i.e. n - number201
of previous points to be used) is critical as containing anomalous regions in202
input sequence makes difficult of creating robust model of normalcy. Note that203
keeping the length of the ARIMA model less than the minimum of time gaps204
between two consecutive attack activities will give better results. However since205
the time gap between two consecutive attack activities is unknown in advance,206
using a smaller observation window (i.e. slicing whole observation period into207
many smaller parts as much as possible) to generate short time profiles would be208
the better. A node does exhibit sudden changes in behaviour when compared to209
its past behaviour is not necessarily suspicious as it could be a regular variation210
of the node behaviour [20]. Proposed Discord analysis technique considers such211
variations as completely legitimate as it monitoring for changes to the changing212
pattern of node behaviour.213
The key challenge for anomaly detection in network security domain is that214
the huge volume of data, typically comes in a streaming fashion, thereby re-215
quiring on-line analysis. It is essential to employ a data reduction method to216
overcome large-scale data handling. Employing statistical sampling would be a217
possible method. Despite the benefits, there is an inherent tension and debate218
of using traffic sampling for security specific tasks. Obviously, signature based219
detection methods can be seriously affected by sampling as selection of a subset220
of signature elements would not be sufficient to recognise a predefined pattern221
in a signature definition database. But in anomaly based detection, should all222
traffic still need to be investigated? In the abstract view, an anomaly is a devi-223
ation of a computed statistic from a norm of the normal statistics. If sampling224
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changes the statistics of normal and anomalous traffic equally, it is reasonable225
to hypothesise that detection would not be affected by the sampling rate. This226
hypothesis is also investigated in this paper.227
4. Employing sampling228
Network data constitutes a potentially unlimited population continuously229
growing up by the time. Using multi-stage sampling with stratification is usual230
in large populations. This ensures that observations are picked from each of231
strata, even though the probability of being selected items from some stratus232
are very low when using simple random sampling (SRS). This feature is very233
useful in a security specific view. Hence, given a smaller observation window w,234
the traffic is sampled using the Stratification sampling technique with optimum235
allocation method. This sampling technique has been designed to provide the236
most precision for the least cost. If h is a traffic stratum, the best sample size237
nh for stratum h during a w is given by:238
nh = n.
[Nh.sh√ch ]∑ Ni.si√
ci
(5)
where nh-sample size for stratum h, n-total sample size, Ni-population size239
for stratum i, si-standard deviation of stratum i, and ci-direct cost (in terms240
of time, bandwidth, and computational resources) on the collection infrastruc-241
ture to sample an individual element from stratum i. Note that the direct cost242
should be in a common unit (CU) of measurement for the amount of computa-243
tional cost spending on different parameters. The time, bandwidth, memory or244
processor requirements that constitutes one common unit (1CU) varies based245
on which requirement is being measured, and how each parameter is critical and246
scarce to the network. Hence definition of such a unit (CU) would be subjec-247
tive. For instance one can define: 1CU is memory equivalent of 128MB, 1CU is248
bandwidth equivalent of 56KBPS, 1CU is CPU-Time equivalent of 100 nsec etc.249
International unit (IU) in pharmacology is a well-known example for a similar250
approach for a common unit of measurement for the amount of a substance [24].251
The main advantage of above sampling technique is producing the most repre-252
sentative sample of a population to the least cost. Hence it is the ideal sampling253
technique to employ with the problem as “cost” parameter can be minimised,254
subject to the required precision, to obtain a light-weighted monitoring scheme.255
The rule of thumb in stratification sampling that a population should not consist256
of more than six strata can be changed even into hundreds given the millions of257
observations in the population in this domain. Traffic classification is employed258
to establish the strata. Using a basic classification technique (e.g. using L4/L3259
access lists and Protocols) would be enough. Stratification ensures that each260
traffic type is adequately represented. The SRS technique is used to select a261
nh size sample from a given stratum h for a w. Random sampling techniques262
have a distinct advantage over other alternative methods for data reduction.263
It allows retention of arbitrary details while other methods for data reduction264
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(e.g. filtering and aggregation) require the knowledge of the traffic features of265
interest in advance.266
Each element of the population having a non-zero probability of selection is267
a preliminary condition for any random sampling techniques. Sampling traffic268
from backbones or edge routers seriously violates this condition in terms of secu-269
rity specific view, though it is sufficient for Traffic engineering and Accounting270
tasks. Since it ignores consideration of traffic within same broadcast domains, it271
ignores potential insider activities as well. Therefore in this work traffic is sam-272
pled at each broadcast domain, but considering the incoming traffic only. All273
outgoing traffic to any external network is considered as a separate broadcast274
domain for the purpose of traffic sampling. Considering incoming traffic only275
avoids selection of a given unit (packet or flow) twice for inclusion in a sample276
at source and destination points.277
5. Tracing the Source278
A common problem with many analysis tools and techniques today is that279
they are simply not designed for purposes of attribution[25]. Attribution of280
cyber activity - “knowing who is attacking you” or “determining the identity281
or location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary”- is naturally a vital282
ingredient in any cyber security strategy [26, 27]. Although current approaches283
are capable of alarming suspicious activities, most of them are not suitable284
for this information age because when computers are under attack “who” and285
“why” are frequently unknown [28, 29].286
The localization process becomes evermore difficult when the attacker em-287
ploys various proxy methods and zombie nodes (e.g. bots), Manipulation of288
TCP/IP elements (e.g. IP Spoofing), using relay or random routing (e.g. Tor289
networks) approaches can help an attacker protecting her location. Prolifera-290
tion of weakly encrypted wireless networks could also help an attacker getting291
anonymous locations. Tracing packets back to the source hop by hop is required292
in identifying sources of anonymous activities. This section presents a method-293
ological way to trace such activities to their approximate sources by extending294
the above monitoring algorithm. The tracing algorithm has two functions: tree295
formation and tree traversal. Tree formation builds an equivalent tree structure296
for a given attack scenario. It enables tree traversal to move towards the at-297
tacker’s physical source.298
299
5.1. Tree formation:300
If the topological information is available, Tree formation is performed as301
follows. The victim node is the starting point. The Gateway node to victim is302
considered as the root of the tree and all immediate visible nodes (either inter-303
nal or external) to the root are considered as children of the root. If a given304
child is a host node in the network then it becomes a leaf of the tree. If it is305
a gateway then it becomes a parent node of the tree and all immediate visible306
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nodes to that node are attached as its children. This process is continued until307
the entire topology is covered (see Figure 22).308
309
input : Topological information together with victim’s location
output: Tree structure for the given attack scenario
Initialize the tree ϑ to have the root as the gateway of the victim;
List all nodes into the list τ ;
/* attached each node to the tree*/;
tree-construction(ϑ,τ);
/*ϑ - Tree;
, ω - A node*/;
foreach node ω in τ do
if num-of-hops-between(ϑ,ω)==1 then
insert ω into ϑ;
end
end
foreach ϑ.child do
tree-construction(ϑ.child,τ)
end
Algorithm 1: Tree formation for a given attack scenario.
310
5.2. Tree traversal:311
Once the equivalent tree structure is built, channel profile score (zkt) should312
be computed for each path of the tree at each step of the tree traversal algorithm313
as shown in Equation 7. Let314
ckt =
∑
t
p(Hk/E)
nk
(6)
where nk is the number of nodes behind k
th channel. Then
zkt =
ckt − c¯t
σt
(7)
315
is the Z-score of channel k at time t. where c¯t =
∑
i
cit
n , σt =
√∑
i
(cit−c¯t)2
n−1 , and316
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n.317
318
To traverse a non-empty tree, perform the following operations recursively319
at each node, starting from the root of the tree, until suspected node is found.320
1. Visit the parent node321
2. Compute channel scores for all children of the parent322
3. Traverse the highest channel scored sub tree if that score is above the323
threshold (if an attacker node is found backtrack to the parent)324
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4. Traverse the next highest channel scored sub trees (only sub trees above325
or around threshold and/or significantly deviated from rest of nodes of326
same parent)327
The algorithm continues working towards a built tree node by node, narrowing328
down the attack source to one network and then to a node. At this point it329
is possible to run more standard trace back methods by contacting the entity330
which controls that network if it is beyond the analyst’s control.331
332
input : A Tree constructed for anonymous stealthy attack scenario
output: A node where attacker is located
proposed-traverse(ϑ);
while not found do
visit node ω;
if node ω is a leaf then
return;
else
profile all children of node;
proposed-traverse(node.top scored child);
proposed-traverse(node.next scored child);
end
end
Algorithm 2: Tree traversal for a given tree.
333
6. Experiments334
A series of experiments were conducted simulating stealthy suspicious ac-335
tivities in simulated networks to evaluate the proposed approach in this paper.336
Simulating such activities on a real network certainly gives more realistic condi-337
tions than in a simulated network. However practical constraints of the project338
keep away using a real world network for this purpose. Network simulator339
NS3 [30] is used to build a network topology (see Figure 1) consisting of a340
server farm and number of subnets of varying size. Table 2 presents a summary341
of specifications of event generation in simulated experiments.342
A Poisson arrival model with inter-arrival time gap between two consecutive343
events as an exponential was assumed for events generation. Each simulation is344
run for a reasonable period of time to ensure that enough traffic is generated.345
Attackers are located at nodes in subnets. Suspicious and benign traffic were346
generated within and between subnets to simulate both attack and legitimate347
activities. Four types of suspicious activities (rate denoted by λa, a =1,2,3,4. in348
Table 2) was simulated. A stealthy attack is defined as a predefined sequence of349
such suspicious events executing an on-off manner. During the off period attack350
node acts as a healthy node. Note that “Noise” in table 2 represents the Suspi-351
cious events generated by healthy nodes, but at different rates λn, n = 1, 2, 3, 4.352
It was ensured to maintain λa ∈ λn±3
√
λn and λn(≤ 0.1) sufficiently smaller for353
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Figure 1: A screen-shot of a network topology used for experiments.
all experiments to characterise stealthy suspicious activities which aim at stay-354
ing beneath the threshold of detection and hiding behind the background noise.355
The idea to use the above relationship for generating attacker activities was to356
keep them within the normality range of innocent activities (i.e. background357
noise).
√
λn is the standard deviation of rates of suspicious events generated by358
normal nodes.359
Though it did not produce all signature elements needed to characterise real360
attacks, representation of suspicious events by a subset of such characteristics361
(parameters) was sufficient to this work as its focus on temporal and spatial362
aspects of events arrivals. Note that traffic classification is sufficient to the pro-363
posed sampling method in this work, and does not require attack classifications.364
Node Event Model Parameters Duration (s) Repetitions
Attack
Legitimate
P
oi
ss
on
µi, i=1,2,3,...,10. 3600*12*60=2592000 or above,
scores are updated at
every minutes (w=60s)
Between 1-100
Suspicious λa, a=1,2,3,4.
Healthy
Legitimate µi, i=1,2,3,...,10.
Noise λn, n=1,2,3,4.
Table 2: A summary of specifications of event generation
Basic payload information, i.e. L4/L3 access lists and Protocols such as365
http, ftp, udp and arp, was used for traffic classification. Traffic which cannot366
identify using basic payload information was pooled into a common stratum.367
A simple R [31] script was written to sample packets as described above. ci368
in Equation 5 is set to a constant value as there is no significant difference of369
13
the cost between different type of traffics (stratum) for inclusion in a sample in370
simulations. Visible source of an event is always considered as the true source371
for experiments in this work. Prior probabilities and Likelihoods are assigned372
as described below.373
p(H1) =
1
2
= 0.5 (8)
Equation 8 suggests there is a 50% chance for a given node to be a stealthy374
attacker. However, this is not the case in many situations. In networks, one375
node may have a higher prior belief of being suspicion than another. Since prior376
probabilities are based on previous experiences, p(H1) can be judged based on377
information gathered from contextual analysis. However if there is no basis to378
distinguish between nodes or groups of nodes, equally likely (i.e. same probabil-379
ity of occurring) can be assumed. For the experiment presented in this paper,380
first followed the equally likely assumption, and prior probabilities were assigned381
as in equation 8. Then the posterior probability of a given node at time t− 1 is382
used as the prior of the same node at time t when time is progressing. This lets383
prior probabilities to adjust itself dynamically according to suspicious evidence384
observed over time.385
p(ej/H1) = kj (9)
Equation 9 expresses the likelihood of producing event ej by a subverted386
node. For the purpose of demonstration different, but arbitrary, values (≤1)387
were assigned for k to distinguish different type of events (ej) produced for the388
simulation. Likelihoods for real world implementation can be estimated as fol-389
lows. If ej is an event resulting from a certain type of known attack (e.g. a390
UDP scan or LAND2 attack), then k can be assigned to one. However, k cannot391
always be one, as described in Section 2, as there are some suspicious events392
(e.g. an alert of multiple login failures) that can be part of an attack signature393
as well as originate from normal network activities. The question is how to es-394
timate p(ej/H1), i.e. the true positives, if ej becomes such an observation. One395
possible solution would be to use existing IDS evaluation datasets to estimate396
true positives. Estimating likelihoods for real world implementation is feasible,397
and [32] is a good example for that which provides a detailed description of the398
likelihood estimation in insider detection.399
According to [13], in some cases, the historical rate of occurrences of certain400
attacks is known and can be used to estimate the likelihood that certain events401
derive from such attacks or it may be sufficient to quantify these frequencies by402
an expert in a similar way to estimating risk likelihoods to an accuracy of an403
order of magnitude. Note that [13]’s claim is completely theoretical as it follows404
2A Denial of Service (DoS) attack which sets the source and destination information of a
TCP segment to be the same. A vulnerable machine will crash or freeze due to the packet
being repeatedly processed by the TCP stack.
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Figure 2: Z- Score graphs are sensitive to node behaviour.
the Subjectivist3 interpretation of probability theory [33]. According to [14], the405
biggest challenge is the absence of large publicly available data sets for research406
and comparisons, but within an organization it is entirely possible to empirically407
analyse day-to-day traffic and build statistical models of normal behaviour.408
7. Results409
In this section, experimental results are presented. Graphical forms (e.g.410
Z-Score graphs) are using to present information. Visualisation helps to quickly411
recognise patterns in data.412
7.1. Peer Analysis Outcomes413
To investigate whether proposed Z-score graphs reflect the behaviour of414
nodes, three attacker nodes were located in a 50 size subnet. All others were415
innocent. Two out of three attackers stopped their attack activities at 200 and416
300 time points respectively. Figure 2 presents the outcome, where A1, A2 and417
A3 are attacker nodes while Min and Max are the minimum and maximum418
Z-scores of normal nodes. T is the Grubbs’ critical value (threshold). If an419
attacker node changed its behaviour, the corresponding z-score graph (see A2420
and A3 in Figure 2) responses to that behaviour by changing its direction.421
Peer analysis technique was tested against 24 test cases varying the subnet422
size between 25 and 250 and the number of attackers between 0 and 7. Peer423
analysis technique was capable of detecting stealthy attackers in all cases. Only424
3There are three fundamental interpretations of probability: Frequentest, Propensity and
Subjectivist. In Subjectivist, probability of an event is subjective to personal measure of the
belief in that event is occurring.
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Figure 3: Z-Scores of node profiles for test case 16.
one case where four stealthy attackers were located in a hundred size subnet425
is presented in Figure 3. In Figure 3, nodes corresponding to A1, A2, A3 and426
A4 denote attackers. Min and Max denote the minimum and the maximum427
Z-scores of normal nodes at each time point. Aberrant node profiles A1, A2, A3428
and A4 in Figure 3 always corresponded to the four stealthy attackers located429
in the subnet. They are above or near the threshold (T ), and most importantly,430
there is a clear visual separation between the set of normal nodes and anomalous431
nodes. Hence it is possible to recognise stealthy suspicious activities using the432
proposed method.433
Behaviour of the proposed approach in best and worst cases is also investi-434
gated. There were no attacks in best cases while all nodes were subverted in435
worst cases. Similar graphs, as shown in Figure 4, were obtained for both cases.436
Almost all the nodes are nearly below the threshold (T ), and none of nodes can437
be seen separated from the majority. In a situation where monitoring system438
depends only on peer analysis technique and has seen similar graphs as in worst439
(or best) cases, it is safe to assume that all nodes are subverted (instead of as-440
suming free of attackers) and doing further investigations on one or two nodes to441
verify. If investigated nodes are attackers, it is reasonable to consider all nodes442
are attackers or vice versa. However, note that Discord analysis technique is443
capable of detecting attackers in worst case too.444
7.2. Discord Analysis Outcomes445
Discord analysis technique was tested against number of test cases used for446
peer analysis, in addition to testing it against a special test case defined as447
follows. In a stealthy attack environment, discords are random time context448
and peer analysis technique itself would not be capable to detect them if the449
progression rates of malicious activities are far lower than the rates of similar450
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Figure 4: Z-Scores of node profiles for test case 7.
innocent activities. Therefore a small subnet consisting of five nodes including451
one attacker was set-up in a subnet. The attacker’s activity rate was decreased452
until observing a node score graph like in Figure 5 where peer analysis technique453
itself failed to detect the attacker. In Figure 5, the attacker which is denoted454
by the red dotted line always keeps a very low profile score than all innocent455
nodes denoted by other lines (see magnified version in Figure 6). As it is seen456
in Figures 5 and 6, the attacker hides behind the normal nodes, and since the457
attacker’s profile score is far lower than all normal nodes it is not detected by458
the peer analysis technique. The randomness of event generation can also be459
seen from Figure 6.460
Discord analysis is capable of detecting the attacker very well in this case.461
First using an ARIMA(p, d, q) model 95% CI is predicted for each node in the462
network (see Figures 7 and 8 which are created for the attacker node and a463
normal node respectively). Then at each time point, anomaly score for all five464
nodes were calculated and converted them to Z-scores and plotted against the465
time line as in Figure 9. Twenty five previous points was used as the length of466
the ARIMA model in this case. In Figure 9, the node corresponded to A denotes467
the attacker. Min and Max denote the minimum and the maximum Z-scores468
of anomaly scores of normal nodes at each time point. T is the Grubbs’ critical469
value (threshold) for a single outlier. As it is obvious in Figure 9 attacker node470
is distinguished from innocent nodes.471
7.3. Network parameters472
This section investigates how different network parameters: traffic volume,473
subnet size and number of attackers affect on monitoring of stealthy activities.474
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Figure 6: Magnified version of Figure 5 - the red dotted line denotes the attacker, all other
lines denote innocent nodes.
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Figure 7: Node scores and 95% CI intervals for the attacker node. Black lines denote CIs
while the red line denotes the attacker (A).
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Figure 8: Node scores and 95% CIs for a normal node. Black lines denote CIs while the
green line denotes the normal node (N).
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Figure 9: Z-Scores of anomaly scores for Discord analysis.
7.3.1. Traffic volume475
A simple measure called detection potential is defined to explain how far476
an attacker node is deviated from the threshold. It helps to compare between477
different network conditions. The detection potential d is defined as:478
d = z − T (10)
on the basis of the higher the detection potential the better for the detection.479
An attacker was located in a 51 size subnet and generated suspicious events.480
The same experiment was repeated six times by keeping all parameters un-481
changed, except attacker’s traffic volume. If the attacker’s traffic volume is482
V at the first time, then at each repetition the attacker’s traffic volume was483
incremented by one time as 2V , 3V , ...,7V . For each experimental run the de-484
tection potential (deviation of node scores from the norm) was calculated, and485
standardised values of the detection potentials are plotted as in Figure 10. As486
shown in Figure 11, the detection potential is proportional to the traffic vol-487
ume. The higher the traffic volume produced by an attacker is the better for488
her detection using the monitoring algorithm.489
7.3.2. Subnet size490
An attacker was located in a 500 size subnet and the same experiment was491
repeated six times by keeping all other parameters, except the subnet size,492
unchanged. Subnet size was changed to 400, 300, 200, 100, 50 and 25 at each493
experimental run, and Figure 12 and 13 were obtained. As shown in Figure 12,494
attackers have a less chance to hide behind innocent events when the subnet size495
decreases. The detection potential is negative exponential to the subnet size,496
and going beyond 100 size subnet would not make any real sense in terms of497
detection (see Figure 13). The smaller the subnet size is the better for detection.498
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Figure 10: Z-Scores of deviations of cumulative node scores.
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Figure 11: Traffic volume vs the detection potential.
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Figure 13: Subnet size vs Detection potential.
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Figure 14: Z-Score graphs for same size subnets with different number of attackers (250 size
subnet, two attackers).
7.3.3. Number of attackers499
The same experiment was repeated many times by keeping all conditions500
unchanged, except the number of attackers. The outcomes of only two test cases,501
two and seven attackers, are presented in Figures 14 and 15. The attacker’s node502
score is dependent on the number of attackers on her own subnet (compare503
attackers’ Z-scores between both graphs).504
7.4. Sampling results505
A series of experiments have been conducted by changing the sampling rate506
r, hence n in Equation 5. Figures 16 and 17 present the outcomes of the pro-507
posed approach when r = 20% and r = 10% of the whole traffic N respectively.508
Min and Max represent the minimum and the maximum profile scores of normal509
nodes in the subnet where attacker node A is located. T represents the Grubbs’510
critical value (threshold) for attackers’ subnet. As it is obvious from Figure 16,511
proposed algorithm together with chosen sampling technique is capable of de-512
tecting stealthy activity using a 20% size traffic sample. It is also possible using513
even a 10% size sample, but after a considerable time lag.514
Figure 18 compares the detection potential against the sampling rate r. It515
is obvious that a point of diminishing returns is existed in Figure 18. When516
r is larger enough to produce a reasonable level of accuracy, making it further517
large would be a simply waste of resources of monitoring infrastructure? This518
answers the question “in anomaly based detection, should all traffic still need519
to be investigated?”520
7.4.1. Network Design521
A sampling process has two types of errors: sampling and non-sampling.522
Sampling error occurs because of the chance, and it is impossible to avoid but523
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Figure 15: Z-Score graphs for same size subnets with different number of attackers (250 size
subnet, seven attackers).
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Figure 16: Running the detection algorithm over 20% size sample.
can be minimised by defining unbiased estimators with small variances. Non-524
sampling errors can be eliminated, and occurred due to many reasons: inability525
to access information, errors made in data processing, etc [34]. This section526
examines what impact would varying network size and subnet structure have527
on Non-sampling error. An attacker is located in a 224 size network and pˆi is es-528
timated in each case as described below. Each simulation was repeated over 100529
times. Goodness-of-fit test [35] is applied to statistically test the independence530
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Figure 17: Running the detection algorithm over 10% size sample.
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Figure 18: Detection potential vs sampling rate.
(or homogeneity) of proportion pi over sampling rates, number of subnets and531
subnet sizes. If any dependency is found it is depicted in a graph (see Figures 19532
and 20).533
Proportion of anomaly packets φ is considered as the parameter of interest534
for this analysis and hence sample proportion pi is defined as pi = (a/n); where535
a is the number of suspicious packets in a given sample size n. Note that536
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Sampling
rate(r)
5% 10% 20% 40% 80% Whole
trace
pˆi 0.00038 0.00034 0.00036 0.00035 0.00036 0.00036
P.Value 0.0970 0.0929 0.0952 0.0971 0.9770 N/A
Table 3: Proportion over sampling rates.
proportion of illegitimate to legitimate traffic, i.e. a : (n − a), is a dominating537
factor for likelihood of false alarms in an IDS [36]. Though the distribution538
of φ is binomial, in a network scenario, this can be approximated by a normal539
distribution given a overwhelm number of packets to deal with (it satisfies the540
conditions of n.pˆi ≥ 15 and n.(1−pˆi) ≥ 15). Hence, φ ∼ Normal
(
pˆi,
√
pˆi(1−pˆi)
n
)
,541
where pˆi is the observed proportion from samples. This can be used to draw542
inference about the unknown population proportion φ.543
Sampling rate (r) Traffic samples at 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, and 80% rates of544
the whole trace were drawn and pˆi was calculated. The null hypothesis H0 is the545
assertion that the sample proportion pi conforms to the whole traffic proportion546
φ. The alternative hypothesis H1 is the opposite of H0.547
H0 : ∀r pir = φ (11)
H1 : ∃r pir 6= φ (12)
pˆis and p-values of testing H0 vs H1 are given in Table 3 where p-values are548
greater than the significance level α = 0.01 for all cases. Therefore there is no549
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis H0. Hence it can be concluded550
that sample proportion pi conforms to the whole traffic proportion φ. In other551
words pi can be used to draw inference about φ, and chosen sampling technique552
is capable of producing representative samples to the population.553
Number of subnets (b) An attacker is located in a 224 size network and554
same experiment was repeated for four more times by doubling the number555
of subnets each time (in other words each subnet was divided into two in its556
immediate repetition) but keeping all other conditions unchanged. The null557
hypothesis H0 is the assertion that the proportion pi is not affected by the558
number of subnets b, where b=1, 2, 4, 8, 16. The alternative hypothesis H1 is559
the opposite of H0. If k is a constant:560
H0 : ∀b pib = k (13)
H1 : ∃b pib 6= k (14)
pˆis and p-values of testing H0 vs H1 are given in Table 4. Since p-values561
are less than the significance level α = 0.01 for some cases it is possible to562
conclude that there is no enough evidence to accept the null hypothesis H0,563
which means that proportion is affected by the number of subnets. Figure 19564
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Number of
Subnets(b)
0 2 4 8 16
pˆi 3.58E-04 2.86E-04 1.12E-04 8.52E-05 1.97E-05
P.Value N/A 2.65E-01 6.03E-06 3.94E-07 1.04E-11
Table 4: Proportion over Number of Subnets.
Figure 19: Proportion vs Number of subnets at each sampling rate.
presents the relationship between number of subnets b and proportion pi at each565
sampling rate. When b is increasing pˆi is decreasing (deviates from the actual566
value) regardless of sampling rates.567
Subnet size (n) An attacker was located in a 5 nodes size subnet in the568
network, and pˆi was calculated at each sampling rate. The same experiment569
was repeated by adding more nodes to produce different subnet sizes: 10, 20,570
40, and 80 without changing other parameters. The null hypothesis H0 is the571
assertion that the proportion pi is not affected by the subnet size n, where n=5,572
10, 20, 40, 80. The alternative hypothesis H1 is the opposite of H0. If k is a573
constant:574
H0 : ∀n pin = k (15)
H1 : ∃n pin 6= k (16)
pˆis and p-values of testing H0 vs H1 are given in Table 5. Since p-values are575
less than the significance level α = 0.01 for some cases there is no enough evi-576
dence to accept the null hypothesis H0, which means that proportion is affected577
by the subnet size. Figure 20 presents the relationship between subnet size n578
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Subnet
Size(n)
5 10 20 40 80
pˆi 7.28E-04 8.61E-04 8.84E-05 2.06E-04 5.24E-05
P.Value 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 2.80E-01 6.39E-04 N/A
Table 5: Proportion over Subnet sizes.
Figure 20: Proportion vs Subnet size at each sampling rate.
and proportion pi, where n is increasing pˆi is decreasing in overall (deviates from579
the actual value), regardless of sampling.580
7.5. Source Anonymity581
Using the topology in Figure 21, attack events were generated with anony-582
mous source addresses in order to simulate two cases: single and multiple at-583
tackers. In the single attacker case, an attacker is located at a node in subnet584
S6 and in multiple attackers case, three attackers are located one in each in585
three different subnets S3, S5 and S6. Figure 22 presents the equivalent tree586
structure produced by Algorithm 1 for above scenario. The root denotes the587
victim node while gij and hij denote a gateway or a host node at level i in Fig-588
ure 22. j is a node number. Dashed rectangles represent a collection of leaves589
corresponded to hosts in each subnet. Once the tree is obtained, Algorithm 2590
is run to locate the attackers as shown in Figure 23 for single attacker, and591
Figure 24 for multiple attackers.592
Figure 23 presents the steps of tracing process from the root of the derived593
tree. In Step 1, Min and Max represent the minimum and maximum Z-scores594
of all immediate visible nodes (11 in total, except g13) to the root at each time595
point. Since that graph suggests moving towards g13 , Step 2 graph is created596
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Figure 21: Network topology used for source anonymity experiment.
at node g13 , and so on. Finally search is narrowing down to the subnet S6.597
Step 4 graph is created at S6 ’s gateway node g34 , where A denotes the Z-598
scores corresponded to the true attacker located in that subnet. Min and Max599
represent the minimum and maximum Z-scores of all other nodes in subnet S6.600
T denotes the threshold which is not defined when number of data points in a601
set is less than three. In that case the highest scored path is chosen to move602
towards (see Step 2) in finding attacker or directions to her location.603
A similar manner should be followed in interpreting graphs in Figure 24604
obtained for multiple attackers. In that case, once an attacker is found tracing605
algorithm should be back tracked to its immediate parent node and should606
proceed with next highest Z-scored sub tree to find other suspicious nodes. After607
Steps 3 and 6, algorithm back tracks to the root node. Table 6 summarises travel608
sequences for tracing single and multiple attackers.609
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Figure 22: Equivalent tree structure for the given scenario.
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Figure 23: Tracing steps: single attacker case.
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610
Scenario Travel sequence (until all attackers are found)
Single attacker root, g13 , g25 , g34
Multiple attackers root, g12 , g23 , root, g13 , g25 , g34 ,root, g11 , g21
611
Table 6: Traversal sequences for tracing attackers.612
8. Related Work613
8.1. Monitoring stealthiness614
A scalable solution for insider detection using Bayesian analysis is presented615
in [13]. Authors maintain incremental profile scores for each node in the system616
and distinguish suspicious nodes from normal nodes by setting a predefined base-617
line. If a cumulative score of a particular node is deviated from the predefined618
control, an anomaly is declared and that node is identified as an insider who619
warrant further investigation. The major drawback of this approach is setting620
a predefined control as the baseline. Setting predefined controls is very chal-621
lenging in network security monitoring. In a network, normal behaviour keeps622
evolving and a current notion of normal behaviour might not be sufficiently623
representative in the future. Threshold needs to evolve according to the context624
and current state of the network. [37] integrates user’s technological traits (sys-625
tem call alerts, intrusion detection system alerts, honey pot, systems logs, etc)626
with data obtained from psychometric tests (predisposition, stress level, etc) for627
insider detection. User profiles are used to identify the users (human actors)628
who warrant further investigation. [37, 38]. [39] is similar to [37]. It provides629
a research framework for testing hypothesises for insider threats by integrat-630
ing employee data with traditional cyber security audit data. This approach is631
based on pattern recognition and model-based reasoning. Reasoner is the pat-632
tern recognition component which analyses the large amount of noisy data to633
distinguish variations from norms. Data is processed using a dynamic Bayesian634
network which calculates belief levels assigned to indicators and assessed the635
current indicators with the combination of previously assessed indicators to de-636
termine the likelihood of behaviours that represent threats. Probabilities are637
assigned for the Reasoner through expert knowledge. Simulation method is used638
to evaluate the proposed approach realising the difficulty to find real cases in639
this domain. When addressing non human threats it finds difficulties due to the640
psychological profiling components. Hence it is highly organisational dependent,641
and expertise knowledge is needed to fine-tune the model in order to fit with642
new environments. However the idea proposed in all above works to incorporate643
wider range of information into the monitoring process is very interesting. This644
idea increasingly becomes popular among security community [14].645
A co-variance matrix based approach for detecting network anomalies is646
proposed in [40]. It uses the correlation between groups of network traffic sam-647
ples. [41] is an approach which uses connection based windows to detect low648
profile attacks with a confidence measure. Multiple neural network classifiers to649
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detect stealthy probes is used in [42]. Evidence accumulation as a means of de-650
tecting stealthy activities is proposed in [43]. A graph-based anomaly detection651
(GBAD) systems is presented in [44] to discover anomalous instances of struc-652
tural patterns in data that represent entities, relationships and actions. GBAD653
is applied to datasets that represent the flow of information between entities, as654
well as the actions that take place on the information. Authors claim GBAD can655
apply to tackle several security concerns including identifying violation of sys-656
tem security policies and differentiating suspected nasty behaviour from normal657
behaviour. Authors acknowledged the need of reducing the time spent for main658
computational bottleneck. Hence these approaches are not efficient in terms659
of computational cost (specially for event correlation) for monitoring stealthy660
activities lasting in several months. Numbers of anomalous instances are far661
fewer than the number of normal instances is a main constraint for correlation662
based anomaly detection approaches [6, 45] to succeed in monitoring for stealthy663
attacks. Accumulating evidence according to a systematic way would help to664
overcome this issue.665
Information visualisation has been proposed in many scholarly works [46, 47,666
36, 48, 49] as a method for anomaly detection . Researches in this line often claim667
“having to go through huge amount of text data (packet traces, log files, etc) to668
gain insight into networks is a common but a tedious and an untimely task as669
terabytes of information in each day is usual in a moderate sized network” [48].670
Therefore they propose to visualise packet flows in the network assuming that671
it will help network professionals to have an accurate mental model of what672
is normal on their own network and hence to recognise abnormal traffic. For673
example, [46] claims that “the human perceptual and cognitive system comprises674
an incredibly flexible pattern recognition system which can recognise existing675
patterns and discover new patterns, and hence recognising novel patterns in676
their environment which may either represent threats or opportunities”. In677
principle all above works acknowledge that visualisation (by means of graphs or678
animation) is useful in identifying anomalies patterns. But our position, though679
visualisation can be motivated on this as visual cognition is highly parallel680
and pre-attentive than the text or speech, it does little on stealthy activities681
monitoring. Just presenting raw data in graphical form would not be sufficient.682
Visualising a traffic flow of a large network for a very long time will end up with683
a very complicated web of traffic flows. It would be very difficult to compare this684
with analyst’s mental model of the netflow already made in mind. Therefore685
some kind of data reduction and simplification (information fusion) is needed686
before visualising security measures. Essentially these approaches are not either687
systematic or accounted for the “motivation” uncertainty behind an event.688
The work presented in [50] is one of the most recent work similar using689
Bayesian for stealthy activities monitoring, but in a different domain detect-690
ing lone wolf terrorists. [21] combines traditional notion of Motive, Means, and691
Opportunity with behavioural analysis techniques to place each individual on a692
sliding scale of insider risk. User behaviour is compared with her own baseline693
and as well as the behaviours of members in their own peer groups using the694
Euclidean distance. A method for detecting insiders with unusual changes in be-695
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haviour by combining anomaly indicators from multiple sources of information696
is provided in [20]. Authors build a global model and find outliers by comparing697
each user’s activity changes to activity changes of his peer group. [51] defines a698
Bayesian network model that incorporates psychological variables that indicate699
degree of interest in a potential malicious insider. A complex Bayesian network700
for capturing conditional dependencies between different attributes can be found701
in [52]. Using Bayesian technique and its variants for intrusion detection can be702
found in [53]. The relevance of information fusion for network security monitor-703
ing is widely discussed [6, 54]. A comparison of performance between Bayesian704
technique, Counting approach, Linear Regression and Artificial Neural Network705
in insider detection includes [32] which concludes that Bayesian technique is706
better than the other methods. Also [13] demonstrates that Bayesian approach707
is superior to the counting algorithm. All above approaches, except [13, 43],708
require storage of large volumes of event data for analysis. Systems that try709
to model the behaviour of individuals or protocols are forced to retain large710
amounts of data which limits their Scalability. Monitoring algorithm proposed711
in this work is different from [13, 43] by hypothesis, analysis technique and712
decision criteria.713
8.2. Data reduction714
With reference to the Sampling, objectives of network monitoring can be715
classified as Traffic engineering, Accounting and Security specific where accuracy716
requirements in each objectives are quite different. Using sampling for Traffic717
engineering and Accounting is widely studied [55], and already been employed718
by commercially available tools [56]. However those studies are not relevant to719
this work as our objective is a security specific. A successful sampling technique720
in Engineering and Accounting would not be essentially an efficient method in721
Security. Therefore only security related sampling works will be reviewed in this722
section. [57] samples malicious packets with higher rates to improve the quality723
of anomaly detection. High malicious sampling rates are achieved by deploy-724
ing in-line anomaly detection system which encodes a binary score (malicious725
or benign) to sampled packets. Packets marked as malicious are sampled with726
a higher probability. Obviously this approach involves additional processing727
and storage overheads. [58] evaluates quantitatively how sampling decreases the728
detection of anomalous traffic. Authors use the packet volume as the parame-729
ter of interest for this analysis. That work concludes that detecting anomalies730
with low sampling rates is entirely possible by changing the measurement gran-731
ularity, and uses relationship between the mean and the variance of aggregated732
flows to derive optimal granularity. Proposed analysis method in this work was733
impressed by this idea. [59] investigates the performance of various methods of734
sampling in network traffic characterisation. They use several statistics that can735
be used to compare two distributions for similarities, and to compare sample736
traces with their parent population. [60] evaluates the effect of the traffic mix737
on anomaly visibility using traces collected at four different border routers and738
using prior knowledge of two different worm types. Effects of traffic sampling739
on privacy and utility metrics can be found in [61]. But none of above focuses740
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on stealthy activities. Note that methods proposed for typical rapid attacks741
cannot be used to monitor for stealthy activities due to several constraints in-742
cluding the limitations of computational resources [12, 13, 62, 63]. To the best743
of authors knowledge, the work presented in this paper is the first attempt to744
use sampling technique for stealthy activity monitoring in computer networks.745
Based on the sampling frame, existing sampling proposals can be classified746
into two groups: packet-based and flow-based. Packet-based techniques [57, 58,747
59, 60, 64, 65] consider network packets while flow-based techniques [66, 64, 67]748
consider network flows as elements for sampling. Packet sampling is easy to749
implement as it does not involve any processing before selection of samples.750
But in the case of flow sampling, monitored traffic is processed into flows first751
and then apply sampling technique on whole set of flows for drawing a sample.752
This requires to use more memory and CPU power of network devices. The753
most widely deployed sampling method in the literature is packet sampling. It754
is computationally efficient, requiring minimal state and counters [60]. [68] is755
a study of combination of packet and flow sampling. A comparison of packet756
vs flow sampling can be found in [66]. According to [66, 67] flow sampling is757
more accurate than packet sampling. However it should be noted that this not758
necessarily means that flow sampling is always better than packet sampling.759
However, suitability of a sampling method depends on the input parameters to760
the detection algorithm and monitoring objectives. For example, if inputs to the761
detection algorithm is flows, obviously flow sampling should be performed well762
in that scenario than sampling on any other element. [64, 65] are examples to763
justify that suitability of a sampling frame depends on the detection algorithm.764
Former investigates how packet sampling impacts on three specific port scan765
detection methods and the same work has been extended in later to investigate766
the impact of other methods. Event based and Timer based are the two possible767
mechanisms to trigger the selection of a sampling unit for inclusion in a sample.768
Event based approaches collect one elements out of N elements using the chosen769
sampling method. Naive 1 inN sampling strategy by Cisco NetFlow [56] is a well770
known example for that method. It samples one packet after every N packets.771
Event based approaches consume more CPU and memory of network devices as772
it involves some processing (counting). In a timer based approach, one packet is773
sampled during N time units. Though this approach is effective in terms of CPU774
and memory consumption, since it depends on the system timer, choosing larger775
Ns returns higher sampling errors due to the non-time-homogeneous nature of776
packets arrivals to the network.777
8.3. Tracing778
Tracing back is one of the most difficult problems in network security, and779
a lot of research being conducted in this area [69, 70]. But deterministic packet780
marking and out of band approaches are not relevant to this work as proposed781
approach in this work is a probabilistic approach. [71] controls the flooding tests782
network links between routers to approximate the source. To log packets at key783
routers and then to use data mining techniques in determining the path which784
packets traversed through the network is proposed in [72, 73]. The upside of785
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this approach is traceability of an attack long after it has completed. As it is786
obvious, a downside is that not scalable. [74] propose to mark within the router787
to reduce the size of packet log and to provide confidentiality using a hash-based788
logging method. [75] suggest probabilistically marking packets as they traverse789
through routers. Authors propose router marking the packet with either the790
routers IP address or the edges of the path that the packet traversed to reach the791
router. With router based approaches, the router is charged with maintaining792
information regarding packets that pass through it. However above approaches793
are focused on DDoS attacks while this paper interests on events related to slow794
stealthy attacks.795
9. Conclusion796
Analysts find difficulties to weed through the noise of routine security events797
and determine which threats warrant further investigations. The profiling tech-798
nique presented in this paper addresses this issue acting as early warning system.799
It acknowledges the motivation uncertainty to reduce the possible false alarms800
which prevent distraction from actual malicious activities. Proposed approach801
maintains long-term estimates computed on sampled data that individuals or802
nodes are attackers rather than retaining event data for post-facto analysis.803
These estimates can be used as triggers of threats which enable authorities to804
respond to protect systems and deter attackers, for example, by physical, proce-805
dural and technical controls such as reduction in permissions and privileges and806
other incident response activities. Proposed method (section 3) significantly807
reduces the data amounts to handle and maintain. It maintains only a num-808
ber of digits equal to the number of nodes in the network to provide a unified809
view of the state of the network. One advantage of this monitoring strategy810
is combining multiple indicators not in an ad-hoc but rather in a data-driven811
manner. Sampling technique utilised in this work draws representative samples.812
However required level of sampling rate depends on several factors: detection813
algorithm, parameter of interest, sampling method, level of precision required,814
duration of monitoring, rate of attack events etc. Further research is needed to815
identify limitations of sampling in security of cyber physical security systems.816
With regards to the attribution, finding the correct origin of the activities is817
very important in cyber systems to locate the right person responsible with a818
view of persuading them not to do that again. In a situation there are mul-819
tiple suspected sites to investigate prioritisation centres of attention would be820
a problematic. Proposed tracing algorithm would help on that, but not solved821
the attribution problem completely. Investigating more advanced anonymity822
monitoring technique (e.g. [76]) with the tracing algorithm will be interesting823
to develop it as more attribution oriented. This is left as future work.824
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